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Until recently, when European lawyers in the United States talked about Eu-
ropean law the real subject was the dichotomy between common law and civil
law. Again and again one was told that Continental law belonged to the civil law
tradition, that the Anglo-American law was part of the common-law tradition
and, most importantly, that they both were worlds apart from each other. This
comfortable proposition always had its weaknesses, as becomes more and more
apparent. Recent legal research has revealed that England has been, and still is,
much closer to the Continent than the Continentals and English themselves have
ever thought. The Continent never was cut off-as the English liked to say. The
European jus commune of the Middle Ages, the canon law and with it the Roman
law had a great influence in England. The same is true for the European com-
mercial law, as it spread from Venice up the Rhine Valley to Brussels and the
Netherlands and from there to England. England in turn had a heavy impact on
the Continent. England was and is in Europe, and Europe was and is in England.'
The closer England moves towards the Continent, the further it drifts from the
notion that English and American law, that is, Anglo-American law, are closer
than English law and the Continental civil law. First, there is the difference in
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language. As Jerome Frank said, "We Americans are not English. And our
speech-what we talk-is not English, but American." 2 A different language
tends to make a different law.3 Second, there are obvious differences in legal rules,
in the judiciary, in people's perceptions, and in the legal, economic, and social
environment. All of these differences contribute to the fact that there is no longer
one common law. Atiya has made this point forcefully and convincingly. 4 There
is an English common law and an American common law. English common law
is "civilized" though this does not mean that American law is "not civilized."
There is some indication that America is developing a legal culture of its own.
At Stanford University, a course of "Western Civilization" collapsed under
violent opposition. The "dead white male Westerners" are having hard times.
While English and American law are moving apart, English law is becoming
an integral part of the community of European legal cultures having a strong
common background. The coming closer together of the European legal cultures
is both the basis and the result of the growing European Community (EC) law.
It is on the law of the Member States of the European Communities that the
Community law has its strongest and most dynamic impact.
The following article illustrates how EC law revolutionizes silently, yet
quickly, the national laws of the Member States, how it changes the legal and
economic structures of the EC Member States, and how it bridges gaps that exist
and will continue to exist between the legal cultures of the Member States.
Harmonization, not unification, is the aim. The dynamics are visible only to the
discerning eye, yet they go right into the center of European legal cultures. The
emerging European legal system is at the same time a case study in law and
economics.
I. The European Court of Justice
A legal order is nothing but dead letters unless there are people who identify
with it, unless there is a widespread political will to make letters come to life and
to bring spirit to them. Those people and such political will were there when they
were needed: in 1958 when the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC), commonly referred to as the Treaty of Rome, came into
force. In the beginning, the interest of the wider public turned to the President of
the European Commission, to the Commission, the Community's executive
body, and to the Council of Ministers, the legislative assembly of the EEC. It was
the Commission that pushed the European idea ahead with relentless vigor.
While it did its best to fill the Treaty with life, the Commission could not have
2. Anon Y. Mous (a.k.a. Jerome Frank), The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA.
L. REV. 625, 626 (1943).
3. BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 85 (1990).
4. Patrik S. Atiya, Lawyers and Rules: Some Anglo American Comparisons, 37 Sw. L.J 545
(1983). But see also Kagan, The Role of the West, YALE ALUMNI MAG. 43 (Nov. 1990).
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fulfilled its task without the support of the European Court of Justice, which
many regard as a silent powerhouse in the backyard. 5 The Commission and the
Court lead the European Community. The chances are that the European Court
has been and continues to be the real shaper of a new and truly European culture.
The members of the Court are independent judges who are exposed neither to
national pressures nor to public interrogations. Their terms have to be renewed,
however, after six years. The influence of the Court has been strong as it has
done its job in an unassuming low-keyed, technical manner, thus shunning pub-
licity. The judicial appointments are held by justices trained to avoid publicity, to
look only after their offices, and not to articulate themselves and to show them-
selves off in dissenting opinions. There is only the opinion of the Court.
Given this background, judge-made European law can creep into almost every
area of day-to-day life that has economic implications. Practically no major
national economic legislation is left that can be passed without a view to Brus-
sels. Brussels has become a synonym for a vital legal order based on the Treaty
of Rome, which is initiated and implemented by the Commission in Brussels and
interpreted and shaped by the competent and independent Luxembourg Court.
European law comes in as on a cat's feet; smoothly, silently; yet it has turned out
to be a silent tiger.
II. New legal Order
The strength of the new legal order of the European Communities as a decisive
shaping force was not visible at the outset. It started early in 1963. The first case
in point dealt with article 12 of the EEC Treaty, which reads as follows: "[M]em-
ber States shall refrain from introducing, as between themselves, any new customs
duties on imports or exports or any charges having equivalent effect, and from
increasing those which they already levy on their trade with each other."
6
The issue was a relatively minor one. The case concerned the reclassification
of ureaformaldehyde by the Dutch authorities. As a result of the reclassification,
the import duty changed from 3 to 10 percent. The Dutch and the Belgian
Governments both argued that the case did not involve European law as the issue
of supremacy of EEC law over Dutch law could only be decided by Dutch courts.
The governments also argued that European law could be enforced against a
Member State only by means of an action of the European Economic Community
under articles 169 and 170 of the EEC Treaty. Under these provisions the Com-
mission or a Member State can sue a Member State for violation of the EEC
Treaty. The Community cannot, however, enforce a judgment by the European
Court of Justice against a Member State that is in violation of the Treaty.
5. For details, see generally GERHARD BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1981).
6. Case 26/62, N. V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos &
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105, 107-08.
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The Court took the case as the starting point for creating a preemption-like
principle of law. In the now famous words of the Court:
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market whose
operation is of ditect concern to everyone within the jurisdiction of the Community,
implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement creating reciprocal obligations
between the contracting States .... The Community presents a new legal order in
international law for the benefit of which the member States have, albeit to a limited
extent, surrendered their sovereign rights, and whose subjects are not only the member
States but individuals as well. Thus, Community law, which is independent of the laws
of the member States, while it creates obligations for individuals, also gives rise to
rights which become part of their legal heritage.7
Prior to this decision, words like "surrender of sovereign rights" and the
observation that European law had become part of the national legal heritage had
been unheard of. They were indeed very strong words the implications of which
should be felt in the future.
An immediate consequence of the Court's ruling was that article 12 of the
EEC Treaty was held to be directly applicable and to preempt statutory national
law not in accordance with the law of the EEC. The Court's position was clarified
only a year later, when the supremacy of Community law was firmly established:
Unlike ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty established its own legal order,
which was incorporated into the legal systems of the Member States at the time the
Treaty came into force and to which the courts of the Member States are bound. In fact,
by establishing a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, per-
sonality and legal capacity, the ability to be represented on the international level and,
particularly, real powers resulting from a limitation of the jurisdictions of the States or
from a transfer of their powers to the Community, the States relinquished, albeit in
limited areas, their sovereign rights and thus created a body of law applicable to their
nationals and to themselves.
This incorporation into the law of each member country of provisions of a Commu-
nity origin, and the letter and spirit of the Treaty in general, have as a corollary the
impossibility for the States to assert-as against a legal order accepted by them on a
reciprocal basis-a subsequent unilateral measure which could not be challenged by it.
The executory power of Community law cannot, in fact, vary from one State to another
because of subsequent internal laws without jeopardizing fulfillment of the Treaty. ...
The obligations agreed to in the Treaty would not be unconditional, only contingent, if
they could be challenged by future legislative acts of the signatories.'
As a result, the law of the European Communities had become an integral part
of the Member States' legal system and was meant to move on from there.
III. Supremacy
The Community law even ranks supreme over the Member States' constitu-
tional laws. In a later case the European Court held that Community law sets
7. Id.
8. Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale per I'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964 E.C.R. 585, 1964
C.M.L.R. 425, 455.
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aside "any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or
subsequent to the Community rule." 9 This, the Court said, was "the very es-
sence of Community law."1 0 Initially, there was some grumbling resistance from
the national courts of the Member States. In one way or another, however, they
all came to accept the supremacy of European law. Another decisive step in
overcoming opposing national views was the Court's effort to develop general
principles of European law that granted protections similar to national funda-
mental rights." As a result, the German Constitutional Court, for example, will
no longer review European law on the basis of the standards of the fundamental
rights contained in the German Constitution. 12
IV. The British Example
A. THE FACTS
The tremendous importance of the supremacy of Community law in terms of
sheer power and the economic consequences cannot be overestimated. The most
dramatic example is the recent British Fishing case. 13 The issue was submitted
to the European Court of Justice on a request for a preliminary ruling according
to article 177 of the EEC Treaty from the English House of Lords.14 The facts
were as follows: The British Merchant Shipping Act of 1988 provided that a
fishing vessel can only be registered in the United Kingdom if: (a) the vessel is
British owned; (b) the vessel is managed and its operations are directed and
controlled from within the United Kingdom; and (c) any charterer, manager, or
operator of the vessel is a qualified person or company. Qualified persons are
limited to British citizens residing and domiciled in the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom wanted to protect the British fishing quotas under the
European quota system. The Act was aimed at stopping the practice of quota
hopping, whereby British fishing quotas were plundered by vessels flying the
British flag though lacking any genuine link with the United Kingdom. This had
become the practice of many Spanish vessels after Spain's accession to the
9. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978
E.C.R. 629, 1978 C.M.L.R. 263, 283.
10. Id.
11. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle for Getreid
und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1972 C.M.L.R. 225 (1970); Case 4/73, J. Nold KG v. Com-
mission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 338; Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz,
1979 E.C.R. 3727, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 42.
12. Case 2 BvR 197/83, Re the Application of Wiunsche Handelsgesellschaft, [1987] 3
C.M.L.R. 225 (BVerfGE 1986).
13. Case C-213/89, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd., [1990]
3 C.M.L.R. 1. For details of this case, see Konstantin D. Magliveras, Fishing in Troubled Waters:
The Merchant Shipping Act 1988 and the European Community, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 899 (1990).
14. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., [1989] 2 All E.R. 692
(H.L.).
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Common Market. The Spanish Government attacked the British statute as vio-
lating several provisions of the Treaty against any discrimination on the grounds
of nationality.
B. BRITISH COURTS
The Divisional Court submitted the case to the European Court of Justice for
a preliminary ruling under article 177 of the EEC Treaty. While the case was
pending, the lower court granted an injunction against the British Government to
suspend the application of the new provisions and to continue to apply the old
statutory language. 15
The interim order went to the Court of Appeal. Lord Donaldson, M.R., saw
Community law as "long on principle and short on specifics" (a statement of fact
rather than a criticism) and saw the future of English law as follows: "National
law is effective at present, but its life span is predictably short." 16 Yet, according
to Lord Donaldson, it was not all that short. The court set aside the injunction
on the ground that it "is fundamental to our [unwritten] constitution that it is for
Parliament to legislate and for the judiciary to interpret and apply the fruits of
Parliament's labour. Any attempt to interfere with primary legislation would be
wholly unconstitutional." 17 It is important to note, however, that the courts of the
United Kingdom do not have the power to suspend by way of interim relief the
application of statutes or to grant an injunction against the Crown.
On appeal, the House of Lords stated the European law issue as follows:
[T]his appeal must fall to be dismissed unless there is ... some overriding principle
derived from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice which compels na-
tional courts of member states . . . to provide an effective interlocutory remedy to
protect putative rights in Community law ... notwithstanding that the existence of the
rights is in dispute and will not be established unless and until the European Court so
rules.'' 18
Lord Bridge concluded:
I must confess that at the conclusion of his argument I was strongly inclined to the view
that, if English law could provide no effective remedy to secure the interim protection
of the rights claimed by the appellants, it was nevertheless our duty under Community
law to devise such a remedy."' 19
C. EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
The House of Lords referred the question to the European Court of Justice for
a preliminary ruling. The European Court of Justice gave the following answer:
15. Factortame, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. at 353, 357.
16. Id. at 396.
17. Id. at 397.
18. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd., [1989] 2 All E.R. 692,
703 (H.L.).
19. Id. at 709.
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"All national rules are invalid, if they prevent a national court from setting aside
any national provision that hampers even temporarily the full effect of Commu-
nity law." 20 As a result, if it is only a national rule that precludes the court from
granting an interim relief, the court must set aside that rule.
D. EUROPEAN INJUNcTION
This is, however, only half of the story. The European Commission also sued
the British Government, under article 169 of the EEC Treaty, for violation of the
EEC Treaty. The Commission asked the European Court for an interim order
pursuant to article 186 of the EEC Treaty against the United Kingdom to suspend
the application of the nationality requirements of the British Merchant Shipping
Act of 1988. The President of the Court granted the injunction; 2' pursuant to that
injunction the United Kingdom promulgated an order in council amending the
1988 Act accordingly.
22
V. Power of Directives
A. NATURE OF DIREcTIvEs
The European Court of Justice did not stop there. Not only did it give imme-
diate effect and supremacy to Treaty provisions, but it also considerably broad-
ened the internalization of the secondary European law.23 Secondary European
law almost always takes the form of regulations or directives. What is the
difference? According to article 189 of the EEC Treaty, "[a] regulation shall
have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable
in all member States." A directive, by contrast, "shall be binding, as to the
results to be achieved, upon each member State to which it is addressed, but shall
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods."
24
Thus, a directive is a source of uniform European law. It goes beyond a model act
such as the Uniform Commercial Code in that the Member States are obliged under
the EEC Treaty to implement a directive. Directives are aimed at Member States.
They obligate them to introduce legislation implementing the directive. Directives
have become a major vehicle for shaping the laws of the Member States because, at
least under the Continental European rules of interpretation, the national laws of a
Member State that implement an EEC directive are to be interpreted in light of the
parent directive in order to give the directive the fullest effect possible. This ap-
proach was considerably strengthened by the European Court of Justice.
20. Factortame, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
21. Case 246/89R, Re Nationality of Fishermen: Commission v. United Kingdom, [1989] 3
C.M.L.R. 601 (E.C.J.).
22. See also Case 216/87, Regina v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food, ex parte Jaderow
Ltd., [1990] 2 CEC (CCH) 380 (E.C.J.).
23. Albrecht Bach, Direkte Wirkungen von EG-Richtlinien, 45 JURISTENZErruNG 1108 (1990).
24. EEC Treaty art. 189.
SPRING 1992
132 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
B. DIRECT EFFEcTs
What happens if a Member State does not implement a directive properly or
delays its implementation contrary to the time limit set by the directive? This
issue arises frequently, not so much because of bad faith, but because of political
opposition in the Member States. There might also be different styles of legis-
lative drafting and different views as to the interpretation of a directive.
The initial view was that it was for the Commission to enforce the uniform
observance of the laws under article 169 of the EEC Treaty. Yet, a suit by the
Commission under article 169 of the EEC Treaty is a time-consuming and
cumbersome procedure. An alternative would be to give private individuals a
right to enforce nonimplemented directives before national courts. By acknowl-
edging the direct applicability of directives (provided they meet certain prereq-
uisites),25 the Court made the European citizens the watchdogs and private
attorneys general to enforce the directives.
The real difference between regulations and directives, then, is that the direct
effect of the regulation is the rule, whereas the direct effect of a directive is the
exception-- at least in theory," as a commentator wisely qualifies. 26 Where a
directive has been adequately implemented, a recourse to the parent directive is
not necessary except for interpretation purposes. 27 The Court acknowledged the
direct effects of directives as early as 1970.28 The Court's reasoning is as
follows: Article 189 of the EEC Treaty lays down that regulations are directly
applicable and have a direct effect. But this does not mean that other instruments
do not produce similar effects. Says the European Court of Justice:
It would be incompatible with the binding effect given by Article 189 to directives to
refuse in principle to allow persons concerned to invoke the obligation imposed by the
directive . .. Especially in cases where the Community authorities, by means of a
directive, oblige member-States to adopt a specific course of action, the practical
effectiveness of such measure is weakened if individuals cannot ... take account of it
as part of Community law .... Therefore, a member-State which has not adopted,
within the specified time limit, the implementation measures prescribed in the directive
cannot raise the objection, as against individuals, that it has not fulfilled the obligations
arising from the directive.29
But this is again only half of the story. So far, all cases in which the principle
of direct effects of directives was asserted dealt with obligations of Member
States. Thus, nonimplemented directives can be vertically enforced against the
Member State that has failed to adopt implementing legislation or to adopt it in
25. J. Steiner, Coming to Terms with EEC Directives, 106 LAW Q. REV. 144 (1990).
26. Id. at 146.
27. Case 270/81, Felicitas Rickmers-Linie KG & Co. v. Finanzamt for Verkehrsatdum, 1982
E.C.R. 2771, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 447.
28. Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 825, 1971 C.M.L.R. 1
(1970); Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688.
29. Cas6 8/81, Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Miinster-Innenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53, [1982] 1
C.M.L.R. 499, 512.
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time. Whether or not a nonimplemented directive can also be used either as a
cause of action or a defense in a law suit by a private party against another private
party (horizontal direct effects) is still an open question. In the Marshall case30
the Court held that directives are only binding on Member States, but not as
between individuals. In 1984 the Court had, however, found an ingenious detour.
It took refuge at article 5 of the EEC Treaty, which requires the authorities of
Member States to "take all appropriate measures . to ensure fulfillment of the
obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from the action taken by the
institutions of the Community." 31 The Court held that this obligation was also
binding on the national courts: "It follows that, in applying national law . . . the
national court is required to interpret its national law in the light of the wording
and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result referred to in the
third paragraph of Article 189.' 32
The mandate of article 5 of the EEC Treaty is now the solid basis of the
Court's jurisprudence:
The third paragraph of art. 189 of the Treaty provides that directives are binding, as to
the result to be achieved, upon each member state to which they are addressed. Article
5 of the Treaty requires the member States to take all appropriate measures to ensure
fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from action taken by
the institutions of the Community. It follows from the binding effect which the third
paragraph of art. 189 ascribes to directives and the obligation of cooperation laid down
in art. 5 that the member state to which a directive is addressed cannot evade the
obligations imposed by the directive in question.
33
There is, however, a qualification to be made: The national court's obligation to
interpret the national law in view of the directive "is limited by the general
principles of law which form part of Community law and in particular the
principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity." 34 The legitimate expectations
of individuals should not be infringed, in particular with regard to criminal
penalties. Apart from this proviso, directives can have, and often have, direct
effects among private individuals.
C. NATIONAL REACTIONS
Here again, there was originally some resistance in particular from German
Courts. But not for long. The German Constitutional Court held that the Euro-
30. Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & S.W. Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R.
723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688.
31. Case 14/83, Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E.C.R. 1891, 1915, [1986] 2
C.M.L.R. 430, 442 (1984); confirmed in Case 79/83, Harz v. Deutsche Tradax GmbH, 1984 E.C.R.
1921.
32. Von Colson, 1984 E.C.R. at 1942, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 453.
33. Case 190/87, Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Borken v. Moormann, [1990] 2 CEC (CCH),
465, 490 (E.C.J. 1988).
34. Case 80/86, Officier van Justitie v. Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, 27
(1987).
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pean Court's interpretation of the Treaty was fully in line with a common
European tradition whereby the judge had always been more than "la bouche qui
prononce les paroles de la loi": A judge is more than just the mouth pronouncing
the words of the statute.35
D. DIRECTIVES AND BEYOND
But the European law's dynamics have already gone further. In a recent case,
the Advocate General Van Gerven argued that all provisions of national law have
to be interpreted in conformity with the European law:
In those circumstances we are concerned not with the direct effect of the directive in
question as between individuals but with the natural effect of national law as
interpreted by the courts in accordance with Community law. This means, in my view,
that such an interpretation in conformity with the directive may not be restricted to the
interpretation of national legislation subsequent to the adoption of the directive
concerned or national legislation specially enacted for transposing the directive into
national law. Frequently, national implementing legislation will be involved-as in
Von Colson-but that need not be the case. It is difficult to justify a restriction of the
requirement of interpretation in conformity with the directive to the implementing
legislation itself (quite apart from the difficulty of determining whether or not a given
national provision has been enacted for the purpose of transposing a directive into
national law) since the directive has, as from the time of its adoption and a fortiori as
from the expiry of the period prescribed for its transposition into national law, become
part of Community law and as such takes precedence over all provisions of national
law. 3
6
This seems to be a reasonable conclusion.
VI. Future Developments
The dynamics of these positions for the future cannot be overestimated. They
bring us directly to 1992. The basis for the Community's 1992 program is article
8a of the EEC Treaty, which states: "The internal market shall comprise an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services
and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty."
This provision is more or less a catchword expressing a revitalized political
will on the part of the Member States. The foundations were all laid a long time
ago. Article 100A of the Treaty now provides for a qualified majority (this is
decisive) to approximate the national laws for the purpose of the establishment of
the Single Market (article 8A) by "measures." The majority of these measures
will be directives. The power of directives is thus greatly enhanced. In view of
the growing significance of EEC law, individuals will increasingly refer to the
parent directive to remedy deficiencies in national laws, to clarify ambiguities, or
35. Case 687/85, In re The Application of Frau Kloppenburg, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 19(BVerfGE 1987) (quoting Montesquieu, 18th century French jurist and philosopher).
36. Case 262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Group, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 513,
543, [19901 CEC (CCH) 653, 689 (E.C.J. 1990) (citation omitted).
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to enforce the directive. The European Court of Justice will become a more
important Court in matters of national law, including, but not limited to account-
ing, company law, product liability, civil procedure, conflict of laws, and anti-
trust. The second court that was recently established under article 168A of the
EEC Treaty, therefore, was an absolute necessity given the great workload of the
European Court of Justice.
VII. The Principle of Origin
There is still another way to see the dynamics of the European Community law
and the concentration of power in the European Court of Justice: The principles
of origin, recognition, and home state control. These principles form the basis of
article 100A of the EEC Treaty. The principle of origin and article 100A of the
EEC Treaty have to be seen as supplementing each other.
A. ARTICLE 30 OF THE EEC TREATY
Article 30 of the EEC Treaty provides that "quantitative restrictions on im-
ports and all measures having equivalent effect shall [without prejudice to the
following provisions], be prohibited between Member States." Article 31 of the
EEC Treaty then states: "Member States shall refrain from introducing between
themselves . . . new quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent ef-
fect." There is, however, a qualification of this broad language in article 36 of
the EEC Treaty:
The provisions of articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants;
the protection of natural treasures possessing artistic, historic or archeological value, or
the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised re-
striction on trade between member States.
B. CASSIS DE DIJON
The provisions mentioned became the turning point in the development of a
single market. It all started with a popular French alcoholic drink made from
redcurrant juice known as Cassis de Dijon. The case37 involved a German
plaintiff who wanted to import Cassis de Dijon, but who needed a permit from
the German monopoly administration for alcoholic spirit. This the plaintiff did
not receive. Under German law fruit liqueurs must have a minimum alcohol
content of 25 percent; unfortunately Cassis de Dijon had only 15 to 20 percent.
The European Court held that Member States may regulate matters relating to
alcohol, but that they have to do so in a reasonable way:
37. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R.
649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494.
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Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the
national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted in
so far as these provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision,
the protection of ublic health, the fairness of commercial transactions, and the defence
of the consumer.
The Court could not find any of these reasons and concluded:
It is clear from the foregoing that the requirements relating to the minimum alcohol
content of alcoholic beverages do not serve a purpose which is in the general interest
and such as to take precedence over the requirements of the free movement of goods,
which constitutes one of the fundamental rules of the Community . . . .There is
therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully produced and
marketed in one of the member-States, alcoholic beverages should not be introduced
into any other member-States.39
Any protective measures need to be proportionate. The least restrictive mea-
sure must be chosen. Then the Court took an even more important step by means
of the qualifying phrase "provided that they have been lawfully produced and
marketed in one of the member-States." These words established the principle of
origin, a kind of full faith and credit and interstate commerce clause for products;
yet, not only for products, but also for services and enterprises. Article 100A of
the EEC Treaty should be seen in this context. As applied to the article 100A
context, the principle of origin requires an approximation of the applicable laws.
This is where the thrust of European legislation will lie in the future.
VIII. Further Implications
The principle of origin felled one bastion of national pride after another. While
the Court is cautious not to go too far, it attempts to stay in line with common-
sense opinions, watching closely the emergence of a European spirit.
The German beer brewers felt the full force of the tide very soon:40 Under
Bavarian customary law beer was to be made only from malted barley, hops, yeast,
and water, and not from corn, rice, wheat, or any other grain. The German breweries
were successful in defending their laws for almost five hundred years. Yet, under the
regime of the EEC Treaty, they could not continue to keep "outlandish" beers out
of German throats. Europe won over Bavaria: "[T]he legislation of a member-state
must not 'crystallise given consumer habits so as to consolidate an advantage ac-
quired by national industries concerned to comply with them.' ,41
The Court felt that Germany's law did more than was necessary for the
protection of German consumers and their refined and trained taste for beer. The
38. id., [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 508-09.
39. Id. at 510.
40. Case 178/84, Re Purity Requirements for Beer: Commission v. Germany, 1988 E.C.R.
1227, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 780.
41. Id., [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. at 807.
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Germans got, however, some satisfaction. The Italians experienced similar prob-
lems with their spaghettis and macaronis. Thus, German pasta producers got
back what German beer brewers had lost.42 The principle of origin became a
principle of recognition, which applies also to services. As a result, protective
insurance 43 (that is, damages insurance, but not life insurance) and banking
legislation came under attack. The principle of home country control became of
paramount importance. What was formerly unthinkable became reality: A har-
monized English insurance or banking control might be good enough even for
German insurers and banks. Cassis de Dijon opened up the single market in
practically every economic respect.
IX. Points of Resistance
Are there no points of resistance left? Forced Europeanization in every re-
spect? No, a few oases are still intact.
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Thus, for instance, the national intellectual property systems are basically
respected. This is due to articles 36 and 222 of the EEC Treaty. Article 36 of the
EEC Treaty provides: "The provision of articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on
grounds of protection of industrial and commercial property." Consequently, the
European Court upheld these property rights. 44 But the Court took the second
sentence of article 36 of the EEC Treaty very seriously: "Such prohibitions or
restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or
a disguised restriction on trade between Member States."
This provision led the Court to make the following statement:
Whilst the Treaty does not affect the existence of rights recognized by the legislation
of a member-state in matters of industrial and commercial property, yet the exercise of
those rights may nevertheless, depending on the circumstances, be restricted by the
prohibitions in the Treaty. Inasmuch as it provides an exception to one of the funda-
mental principles of the Common Market, Article 36 in fact admits exceptions to the
free movement of goods only to the extent to which such exceptions are justified for the
purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute the specific subject matter of that
property. 45
Only the specific subject matter of that property is a vested right under Eu-
ropean law. The Court thus draws a line between the existence of rights and their
42. Case 407/85, Drei Glocken GmbH v. Unita Sanitaria Locale Centro-Sud, 1988 E.C.R. 4233.
43. Case 205/84, Re Insurance Services: Commission v. Germany, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69
(E.C.J. 1986).
44. Case 24/67, Parks, Davis & Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55, 1968 C.M.L.R. 47, 59.
45. Case 119/75, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A . Kapferer & Co., 1976
E.C.R. 1039, [19761 2 C.M.L.R. 482, 505.
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exercise. At the same time, the impact of European antitrust laws is growing
steadily. As a result, intellectual property relations are heavily regulated by
European law.46
B. NATIONAL COMPANY LAWS
The national company laws are another field where the impact of European law
is strongly felt. The harmonization of company laws is moving forward fast
under article 54, paragraph 3(g) of the EEC Treaty. The biggest steps ahead so far
are the Fourth Directive on Corporate Accounts, the Seventh Directive on Group
Accounts (a bonanza of new job opportunities for lawyers who wish to become
accountants 47) and the European Insider Dealing Directive. 48 Notwithstanding
the approximation of the laws in these three areas, however, national company
laws are still running strong even though they have been partially harmonized.4 9
This is because, according to prevailing Continental conflict of laws principles,
the "Delaware syndrome" is not likely to become part of corporate Europe.
According to the traditional seat principle of conflict of corporate laws, a
company is required to be incorporated under the laws of the place where it has
its headquarters or its central management. Otherwise the entity will lack cor-
porate legal status. Under the same principle, a company loses its legal capacity
if it transfers its seat from the state of incorporation to another jurisdiction
because it was not created under the new law. Is this practice in conformity with
the European Law on Freedom of Establishment (article 52 of the EEC Treaty),
which is also applicable to companies under article 58 of the EEC Treaty?
This was one of the central issues in the Daily Mail case. 50 For tax reasons, the
Daily Mail Company wanted to transfer its seat from London to the Netherlands,
but to do so it needed a consent from the British Treasury, which it did not
receive. The Daily Mail argued that the consent requirement was invalid under
article 52 of the EEC Treaty and that it was free to transfer its seat to the
Netherlands without securing the consent of the British Treasury. The English
Queen's Bench Division then asked the European Court whether articles 52 to 58
46. HARTMUT JOHANNES, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
(1976). Johannes engineered the European law approach in this field, himself being inspired by
Heinrich Kronstein, Georgetown University School of Law. See also Giuliano Marenco & Karen
Banks, Intellectual Property and the Community Rules on Free Movement: Discrimination Un-
earthed, 15 EUR. L. REV. 224 (1990).
47. See Grossfeld, supra note 1, at 871.
48. Klaus J. Hopt, The European Insider Dealing Directive, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 51
(1990).
49. Thomas E. Abeltshauser, Towards a European Constitution of the Firm: Problems and
Perspectives, II MICH. J. INT'L L. 1235 (1990); ERIC STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY
LAWS (1971).
50. Case 81/87, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 713. For details, see Werner F. Ebke &
Markus Gockel, European Corporate Law, 24 INT'L LAW. 239 (1990). Regina v. H.M. Treasury, ex
parte Daily Mail & General Trust plc.
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of the EEC Treaty precluded a Member State from prohibiting a body corporate
having its central management and control in that Member State, from transfer-
ring its central management and control to another Member State without prior
consent or approval?
Suddenly, the whole body of mandatory rules of the national corporation laws
of the Member States was at stake. The "Delaware syndrome" appeared on the
walls. The Court saw that and held back, finding a subterfuge in article 220 of
the EEC Treaty. The Court summarized its observations as follows:
Certain states require that not merely the registered office but also the real head office,
S.. the central administration of the company, should be situated in their territory, and
the removal of the central administration from that territory thus presupposes the
winding up of the company with all the consequences that winding up entails in
company law and tax law. The legislation of other States [e.g. Great Britain] permits
companies to transfer their central administration to a foreign country but certain of
them, such as the United Kingdom, make that subject to certain restrictions ...."
On the basis of its observations the Court found that [tihe Treaty has taken account of
that variety in national legislation. In defining, in Article 58, the companies which
enjoy the right of establishment, the Treaty places on the same footing, as connecting
factors, the registered office, central administration and principal place of business of
a company. Moreover, Article 220 of the Treaty provides for the conclusion, so far as
is necessary, of agreements between the member-States with a view to securing inter
alia the retention of legal personality in the event of transfer of the registered office of
companies from one country to another. No convention in this area has yet come into
force. 52
Due to the lack of a convention within the meaning of article 220 of the EEC
Treaty, the problems stated, the Court held, "are not resolved by the rules
concerning the right of establishment but must be dealt with by future legislation
or conventions." 
53
As a result, the "Delaware syndrome" has little chance in Europe, though a
kind of pseudo-foreign corporation law approach might be a possible future
solution. Ironically, this all occurred thanks to the British who always preached
the Delaware approach until they themselves were the first in danger to fall prey
to it. Preaching and doing can be quite different. "In the beginning is the doing,"
as Llewellin quoted from Goethe, the great German poet.
C. SOCIO-CULTURAL SENSITIVITIES
1. Public Policy
It is probably in the field of socio-cultural sensitivities that the Court is most
cautious not to go too far. The concept of public policy based on cultural feelings
is an example in support of this proposition. The Member States have some
51. Id. [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 725.
52. Id. at 726.
53. Id.; for an extensive discussion, see Andreas Reindl, Companies in the European Commu-
nity: Are the Conflict-of-Law Rules Ready for 1992?, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1270 (1990).
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But this concept did not prevent even the holy Sunday from coming under
attack-although it ultimately survived. 55 An English authority fined an owner of
do-it-yourself shops for opening its retail stores on Sundays. The owner argued
that the prohibition against serving customers on Sundays was against article 30
of the EEC Treaty (free movement of goods) and was not justified under article
36 of the EEC Treaty. Is the holy Sunday a European trade barrier? The Court
discussed this with a view toward the EEC Treaty and stated that restrictions are
compatible with the Common Market only if they do "not exceed what [is]
necessary in order to ensure the attainment of the objective in view and unless
that objective [is] justified with regard to Community law." 56 But what does this
mean? Is the Sunday justified under European auspices?
The Court provided the answer: "[N]ational rules governing the hours of
work, delivery and sale in the bread and confectionery industry constitute a
legitimate part of economic and social policy, consistent with the objectives of
public interest pursued by the Treaty."
57
Therefore, the Court concluded:
The same considerations must apply as regards national rules governing the opening
hours of retail premises. Such rules reflect certain political and economic choices in so
far as their purpose is to ensure that working and non-working hours are so arranged as
to accord with national or regional socio-cultural characteristics, and that, in the present
state of Community law, is a matter for the member States. Furthermore, such rules are
not designed to govern the pattern of trade between member states.
58
As to proportionality, the question remains whether the restrictive effect of
such measures on the free movement of goods exceeds the effects intrinsic to
such rules? How else could one protect the Sunday? Yet, the Court made it
perfectly clear that "[a]rticle 30. . . does not apply to national rules prohibiting
retailers from opening their premises on Sunday where the restrictive effects on
Community trade which may result therefrom do not exceed the effects intrinsic
to rules of that kind."
59
Thus, it may be permissible under EEC law to protect the Sunday by prohib-
iting retailers from opening their premises on Sundays, but it is clearly a viola-
tion of EEC law if the national prohibition is designed to serve other restrictive
54. Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 17.
55. Case 145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B&Q plc, [1990] 1 CEC (CCH) 167.
56. Id. at 194.
57. Id. at 195.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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trade or commercial purposes. The English court had problems with this enig-
matic interpretation as "every decoding is another encoding," but they upheld
the Sunday rules.
60
The European Court apparently was well aware how strong culturally tainted
time concepts are and how violently cultures resist any interference from the
outside. Consider that the Holy Bible starts with a time statement: "In the
beginning.' 61
3. National Language
A similar position was taken with regard to the requirement that Irish teachers
in grammar schools should have an adequate command of the national Irish
language-though it is spoken by only 33.6 percent of the population of Ire-
land.62 The Advocate General Darman had argued that minority languages are
"essential to preserve Europe's cultural richness and to ensure the diversity of its
linguistic heritage. ' 63 The importance of a language should not be measured
by the present use "but also by the possibility of preserving its use in the
future" :64 "The preservation of languages is one of those questions of principle
which one cannot dismiss without striking at the very heart of cultural iden-
tity."' 65 In support of this view the Advocate General quoted from Roland
Barthes' Le Degrg Zgro de l'tcriture:66 "I1 n'y a pas de pens6e sans langage."
67
The European Court was less enthusiastic about language, but stressed the
purpose of education and the position of teachers:
The importance of education for the implementation of such a policy must be recog-
nised. Teachers have an essential role to play, not only through the teaching which they
provide but also by their participation in the daily life of the school and the privileged
relationship which they have with their pupils. In those circumstances it is not unrea-
sonable to require them to have some knowledge of the first national language.68
Indeed, language is part of our identity69 -and the European law will not
touch it as long as the language requirement stays within reasonable limits.
60. Stoke-on-Trent City Council v. B&Q plc, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 31, 42; W. H. Smith Do-It-All
Ltd. & Payless DIY Ltd. v. Peterborough City Council, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 577. For details, see Paul
Diamond, Dishonorable Defences: The Use of Injunctions and the EEC Treaty--Case Study of the
Shops Act 1950, 54 MOD. L. REv. 72 (1991).
61. Bernhard Grossfeld & Peter Wessels, Zeit, 89 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR VERGLEICHENDE REcHTswis-
SENsCHAFr 498 (1990). See generally Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the
Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631 (1989).
62. Case 379/87, Groener v. Irish Minister for Educ., [1990] 1 CEC (CCH) 336.
63. Id. at 347.
64. Id. at 348.
65. Id.
66. R. BARTHES, LE DEGRP ZItRO DE L'IcRTrURE (1972).
67. Id. at 81.
68. Groener, [1990] 1 CEC (CCH) at 353-54.
69. BERNHARD GROSSFELD, UNSERE SPRAcHE-DIE SICHT DES JURISTEN (1990).
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X. Other Measures
There are many other measures that are shaking up and transforming the
internal national laws of the Member States. I only mention the European Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements, 70 and the Conven-
tions on Product Liability and on Conflict of Contract Laws. As to the latter, there
is even a provision in German law (article 36 Introductory Code to the German
Civil Code) that requires German conflict principles to be interpreted in light of
the European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations
(Rome Convention) and with a view to the necessary harmonization. Article 36
reflects a compulsory comparative law approach of interpretation.
XI. Antimerger Law
It goes without saying that the impact of European antitrust law as embodied
in articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty is enormous. Just consider article 85, paragraph
2 of the EEC Treaty: "Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this
Article shall be automatically void." This provision supersedes national contract
laws.
A famous and most recent example is the European regulation on the control
of concentration between undertakings, which came into force on September 21,
1990. 7 1 This regulation is a breakthrough that was thought to be impossible at the
beginning of the European Community. The background is as follows: The EEC
Treaty does not expressly provide for Community merger control. The existing
antitrust provisions dealt with anticompetitive agreements (article 85) and with
the abuse of a dominant market position (article 86).
The original view was that article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty could not be
applied to mergers, that is, to agreements the purpose of which is the acquisition
of total or partial ownership of enterprises or the reorganization of enterprises.
Thus, the only pertinent provision of the EEC Treaty left was article 86. The
European Court held that article 86 of the EEC Treaty may be used to control
mergers, though only to a limited extent.72 Prior to the Court's holding, article
85 and article 86 of the EEC Treaty were regarded as being mutually exclusive,
following earlier patterns of German antitrust legislation.
The breakthrough came in 198773 when the Court stated that the acquisition by
one company of equity shares of a competitor might serve as a means to influence
the commercial conduct of the companies involved so as to restrict or distort
70. For details, see S. O'MALLEY & ALEXANDER LAYTON, EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE (1989).
71. Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
72. Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215,
1 C.M.L.R. 199 (1973).
73. Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, British Am. Tobacco Co. v. Commission, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R.
551.
VOL. 26, NO. 1
INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF EC LAW 143
competition (in case of legal or de facto control). Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
had thus become applicable to mergers; it was no longer excluded by article 86
of the EEC Treaty. 74 The Court's decision gave the impetus and the legal basis
for the present Merger Control Regulation, which is based on article 3(f), 87,
and 235 of the EEC Treaty. The basic principles of the Regulation are: (1) The
Regulation is applicable to major mergers with a Community dimension;
(2) there is an adequate participation for Member States in the decision-making
process of the Commission. 75 The Commission anticipates that about fifty merg-
ers per year might be subject to the new Regulation.
XII. Where Are We Now?
The introduction to this article stated that, in the past, the differences between
civil law and English common law were largely exaggerated. Common European
roots and common European values had been too often overlooked due to a
narrow national view and a similarly narrow national research interest. Right my
country, wrong all the others! Certainly it cannot be said that the European law
will do away with English or German law. Harmonization, not unification, is the
name of the game. The English will stay with the common law, the Germans with
their civil law. Nevertheless, there are subconscious forces that bring the legal
systems again closer together. English legal influence will be strong. It will be
most strongly felt in insurance, banking, corporate matters, and services. The
language will be an additional advantage.
But it will also work the other way around: From the Continent into England.
Only look at the fact that European legislation is drafted in a Continental Euro-
pean fashion. This legislation will try to provide guidelines for the legal system
as a whole, for its day-to-day operations, rather than exceptional situations.
Also, look at the European Court of Justice. The working language there is
French. This fact inevitably has a subtle influence on legal reasoning and legal
style. We think along the patterns of our languages. This is clearly expressed by
the French-style opinions of the Court: Short, very short indeed, right to the
point.
XIII. European Interpretation
When we look at the major jurisprudential differences between civil law and
common law, we find other approaches towards statutory interpretation. Do we
apply them broadly, taking them as a general basis, or do we construe them
74. The concept of exclusivity has been further eroded in Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing SA
v. Commission, [1990] 2 CEC (CCH) 409.
75. Patrick Thieffry et al., The Notification of Mergers Under the New EEC Merger Control
Regulations, 25 INT'L LAW. 615 (1991); James S. Venit, The "Merger" Control Regulation: Europe
Comes of Age ... Or Caliban's Dinner, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 7 (1990).
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narrowly as an exception to the common law (the golden rule)? Both legal
cultures have to deal with one EEC Treaty, with the same regulations, with the
same directives and, most importantly, with the same methods of interpretation.
Certainly, the ways of interpretation will differ to some extent, but economic and
legal forces will bring them together. Every national law will also have to take
into account developments in other national laws-an absolute necessity under
the principle of origin. Comparative law becomes an instrument of statutory
interpretation, article 36 of the German conflict rules is just a forerunner of many
to come. Furthermore, the national rules about the interpretation of statutes have
to be reviewed-they have to be Europeanized.
It is clearly visible that European legal institutions serve as a model for
national legislation (for example, the new Italian antitrust statute, which is
modeled after articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty). Jurisprudential concepts of
European law, such as the concept of proportionality, will seep into the national
sanctuaries. Already going on is a dialectic process whereby the legal orders of
the Member States are influenced by the European Court's case law. This is
particularly impressive with regard to fundamental freedoms: "Community law
is directly applicable in the domestic sphere" and national courts will follow the
standards established by the European Court of Justice.76
XIV. From Bologna to Luxembourg
We do not have to worry about how all this will happen. Young lawyers trained
with and in European norms will see their chances. They will do the job all by
themselves as a matter of course. They will stream to the European sources as
eagerly as their predecessors streamed to Bologna and Padua in the Middle Ages.
From Venice to Brussels, from Bologna to Luxembourg; the parallelism is evi-
dent and striking. Europe will, one hopes, rediscover her own origins and her
common roots. It is a wonderful example of von Savigny's idea that law is not a
product of human will, but is a common conviction. 77 This fact will have a strong
impact on all the Member States, in particular on the reunified Germany. 78
Europe is our only chance for a stable peace.
76. See Advocate General Mancini in Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders v. The State
(Netherlands), [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 113, 143.
77. Rudolf Stamner, Fundamental Tendencies in Modern Jurisprudence, 21 MICH. L. REV.
623, 647 (1923).
78. Cf. Gregory V.S. McCurdy, German Reunification: Historical and Legal Roots of Germany's
Rapid Progress Towards Unity, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 253 (1990); C.W.A. Timmermans,
German Unification and Community Law, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 437 (1990); Christian Tomus-
chat, A United Germany Within the European Community, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 415 (1990).
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